Bug fix: When the client connects to a server and Kerberos

authentication is  enabled, the  client effectively ignores  any error
from krb5_rd_rep due to a missing branch.

In  theory  this could  result  in  an  ssh  client using  Kerberos  5
authentication accepting  a spoofed  AP-REP.  I doubt  this is  a real
possiblity, however, because  the AP-REP is passed from  the server to
the client via the SSH  encrypted channel.  Any tampering should cause
the decryption or MAC to fail.

Approved by:	green
MFC after:	1 week

This commit is contained in:

Jacques Vidrine

2001-07-13 18:12:13 +00:00

parent 5f662f42d6

commit b33edd3956

1 changed files with 1 additions and 0 deletions

									
										crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c
									
		+1
		
												View File
												
				@@ -802,6 +802,7 @@ try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context)

				                problem = krb5_rd_rep(*context, *auth_context, &ap, &reply);

				                if (problem) { 

						   ret = 0;

						   goto out;

				                } 

						ret = 1;

						break;