From b33edd3956170436a941e68c52cf4f8aa29ddb6f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jacques Vidrine Date: Fri, 13 Jul 2001 18:12:13 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Bug fix: When the client connects to a server and Kerberos authentication is enabled, the client effectively ignores any error from krb5_rd_rep due to a missing branch. In theory this could result in an ssh client using Kerberos 5 authentication accepting a spoofed AP-REP. I doubt this is a real possiblity, however, because the AP-REP is passed from the server to the client via the SSH encrypted channel. Any tampering should cause the decryption or MAC to fail. Approved by: green MFC after: 1 week --- crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c index eb3e66a46fa..679660f93b6 100644 --- a/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c +++ b/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c @@ -802,6 +802,7 @@ try_krb5_authentication(krb5_context *context, krb5_auth_context *auth_context) problem = krb5_rd_rep(*context, *auth_context, &ap, &reply); if (problem) { ret = 0; + goto out; } ret = 1; break;