MAC/do: Rename size constants/variables to clear confusion with string lengths
These constants represent buffer sizes in bytes, not string lengths. While here, move MAX in EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN at start, like the other constants. While here, fix the prefix of the old MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN accordingly. No functional change. Reviewed by: bapt Fixes:8aac90f18a("mac_do: add a new MAC/do policy and mdo(1) utility") Fixes:9818224174("MAC/do: Executable paths feature (GSoC 2025's final state)") MFC after: 1 month Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Pull Request: https://ron-dev.freebsd.org/FreeBSD/src/pulls/38
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@@ -47,10 +47,10 @@ SYSCTL_INT(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, print_parse_error, CTLFLAG_RWTUN,
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static MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MAC_DO, "mac_do", "mac_do(4) security module");
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#define EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN 2048
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#define MAX_EXEC_PATHS 8
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#define MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE 2048
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#define MAX_EXEC_PATHS 8
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#define MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN 1024
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#define MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE 1024
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static unsigned osd_jail_slot;
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static unsigned osd_thread_slot;
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@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ struct id_spec {
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/*
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* This limits the number of target clauses per type to 65535. With the current
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* value of MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN (1024), this is way more than enough anyway.
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* value of MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE (1024), this is way more than enough anyway.
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*/
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typedef uint16_t id_nb_t;
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/* We only have a few IT_* types. */
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@@ -178,12 +178,12 @@ struct rule {
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STAILQ_HEAD(rulehead, rule);
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struct rules {
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char string[MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN];
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char string[MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE];
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struct rulehead head;
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};
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struct exec_paths {
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char exec_paths_str[EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN];
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char exec_paths_str[MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE];
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char exec_paths[MAX_EXEC_PATHS][PATH_MAX];
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int exec_path_count;
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};
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@@ -353,14 +353,14 @@ toast_rules(struct rules *const rules)
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static void
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init_rules(struct rules *const rules)
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{
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_Static_assert(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN > 0, "MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN <= 0!");
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_Static_assert(MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE > 0, "MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE <= 0!");
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STAILQ_INIT(&rules->head);
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}
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static void
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init_exec_paths(struct exec_paths *const exec_paths)
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{
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_Static_assert(EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN > 0, "EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN <= 0!");
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_Static_assert(MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE > 0, "MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE <= 0!");
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bzero(exec_paths, sizeof(*exec_paths));
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exec_paths->exec_paths_str[0] = 0;
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}
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@@ -1034,7 +1034,7 @@ parse_single_rule(char *rule, struct rules *const rules,
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* Must be called with '*parse_error' set to NULL. Returns 0 on success, with
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* '*rulesp' made to point to a 'struct rule' representing the rules. On error,
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* the returned value is non-zero and '*rulesp' is unchanged. If 'string' has
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* length greater or equal to MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, ENAMETOOLONG is returned. If
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* length greater or equal to MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE, ENAMETOOLONG is returned. If
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* it is not in the expected format, EINVAL is returned. If an error is
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* returned, '*parse_error' is set to point to a 'struct parse_error' giving an
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* error message for the problem.
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@@ -1062,10 +1062,10 @@ parse_rules(const char *const string, struct rules *const rules,
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char *copy, *p, *rule;
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int error = 0;
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if (len >= MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN) {
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if (len >= MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE) {
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make_parse_error(parse_error, 0,
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"Rule specification string is too long (%zu, max %zu)",
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len, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN - 1);
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len, MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE - 1);
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return (ENAMETOOLONG);
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}
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@@ -1108,10 +1108,10 @@ parse_exec_paths(const char *const string, struct exec_paths *const exec_paths,
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char *copy, *p, *path;
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int error = 0;
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if (len >= EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN) {
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if (len >= MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE) {
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make_parse_error(parse_error, 0,
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"Exec path specification string is too long (%zu, max %u)",
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len, EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN - 1);
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len, MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE - 1);
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return (ENAMETOOLONG);
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}
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@@ -1315,7 +1315,7 @@ set_default_conf(struct prison *const pr)
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struct conf *const conf = alloc_conf();
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strlcpy(conf->exec_paths.exec_paths_str, "/usr/bin/mdo",
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EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN);
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MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE);
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strlcpy(conf->exec_paths.exec_paths[0], "/usr/bin/mdo", PATH_MAX);
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conf->exec_paths.exec_path_count = 1;
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@@ -1428,7 +1428,7 @@ parse_and_set_conf(struct prison *pr, const char *rules_string,
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static int
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mac_do_sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
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{
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char *const buf = malloc(MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, M_MAC_DO, M_WAITOK);
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char *const buf = malloc(MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE, M_MAC_DO, M_WAITOK);
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struct prison *const td_pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
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struct prison *pr;
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struct conf *conf;
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@@ -1436,10 +1436,10 @@ mac_do_sysctl_rules(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
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int error;
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conf = find_conf(td_pr, &pr);
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strlcpy(buf, conf->rules.string, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN);
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strlcpy(buf, conf->rules.string, MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE);
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prison_unlock(pr);
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error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, buf, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN, req);
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error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, buf, MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE, req);
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if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL)
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goto out;
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@@ -1464,13 +1464,13 @@ SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, rules,
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SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_SYS_SUBNODE(mac, do, CTLFLAG_RW, "Jail MAC/do parameters");
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SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_mac_do, rules, CTLFLAG_RW, MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN,
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SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_mac_do, rules, CTLFLAG_RW, MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE,
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"Jail MAC/do rules");
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static int
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mac_do_sysctl_exec_paths(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
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{
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char *const buf = malloc(EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN, M_MAC_DO, M_WAITOK);
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char *const buf = malloc(MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE, M_MAC_DO, M_WAITOK);
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struct prison *const td_pr = req->td->td_ucred->cr_prison;
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struct prison *pr;
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struct conf *conf;
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@@ -1478,10 +1478,10 @@ mac_do_sysctl_exec_paths(SYSCTL_HANDLER_ARGS)
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int error;
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conf = find_conf(td_pr, &pr);
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strlcpy(buf, conf->exec_paths.exec_paths_str, EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN);
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strlcpy(buf, conf->exec_paths.exec_paths_str, MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE);
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prison_unlock(pr);
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error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, buf, EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN, req);
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error = sysctl_handle_string(oidp, buf, MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE, req);
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if (error != 0 || req->newptr == NULL)
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goto out;
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@@ -1503,7 +1503,7 @@ SYSCTL_PROC(_security_mac_do, OID_AUTO, exec_paths,
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0, 0, mac_do_sysctl_exec_paths, "A",
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"Colon-separated list of allowed executables");
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SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_mac_do, exec_paths, CTLFLAG_RW, EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN,
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SYSCTL_JAIL_PARAM_STRING(_mac_do, exec_paths, CTLFLAG_RW, MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE,
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"Jail MAC/do executable paths");
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static int
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@@ -1568,7 +1568,7 @@ mac_do_jail_check(void *obj, void *data)
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{
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struct vfsoptlist *opts = data;
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char *rules_string, *exec_paths_string;
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int error, jsys, rules_len = 0, exec_paths_len = 0;
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int error, jsys, rules_size = 0, exec_paths_size = 0;
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bool has_rules, has_exec_paths;
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error = vfs_copyopt(opts, "mac.do", &jsys, sizeof(jsys));
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@@ -1587,26 +1587,26 @@ mac_do_jail_check(void *obj, void *data)
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}
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/*
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* We use vfs_getopt() below instead of vfs_getopts() to get the length.
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* We perform the additional checks done by the latter here, even if
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* jail_set() calls vfs_getopts() itself later (they becoming
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* inconsistent wouldn't cause any security problem).
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* We use vfs_getopt() below instead of vfs_getopts() to get the
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* string's buffer size. We perform the additional checks done by the
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* latter here, even if jail_set() calls vfs_getopts() itself later
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* (they becoming inconsistent wouldn't cause any security problem).
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*/
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/* Rules. */
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error = vfs_getopt(opts, "mac.do.rules", (void **)&rules_string,
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&rules_len);
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&rules_size);
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if (error == ENOENT)
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rules_string = NULL;
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else {
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if (error != 0)
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return (error);
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if (rules_len == 0 || rules_string[rules_len - 1] != '\0') {
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if (rules_size == 0 || rules_string[rules_size - 1] != '\0') {
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vfs_opterror(opts,
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"'mac.do.rules' not a proper string");
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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if (rules_len > MAC_RULE_STRING_LEN) {
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if (rules_size > MAX_RULE_STRING_SIZE) {
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vfs_opterror(opts, "'mac.do.rules' too long");
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return (ENAMETOOLONG);
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}
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@@ -1614,19 +1614,19 @@ mac_do_jail_check(void *obj, void *data)
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/* Executable paths. */
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error = vfs_getopt(opts, "mac.do.exec_paths",
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(void **)&exec_paths_string, &exec_paths_len);
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(void **)&exec_paths_string, &exec_paths_size);
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if (error == ENOENT)
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exec_paths_string = NULL;
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else {
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if (error != 0)
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return (error);
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if (exec_paths_len == 0 ||
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exec_paths_string[exec_paths_len - 1] != '\0') {
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if (exec_paths_size == 0 ||
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exec_paths_string[exec_paths_size - 1] != '\0') {
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vfs_opterror(opts,
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"'mac.do.exec_paths' not a proper string");
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return (EINVAL);
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}
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if (exec_paths_len > EXEC_PATHS_MAXLEN) {
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if (exec_paths_size > MAX_EXEC_PATHS_SIZE) {
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vfs_opterror(opts, "'mac.do.exec_paths' too long");
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return (ENAMETOOLONG);
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}
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