capsicum.4: Add some more detail from the Capsicum paper
Adapt some language from "Capsicum: practical capabilities for UNIX" https://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/capsicum/papers/2010usenix-security-capsicum-website.pdf Reviewed by: markj Discussed with: rwatson Event: Kitchener-Waterloo Hackathon 202506 Sponsored by: The FreeBSD Foundation Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D50855
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
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.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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.\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\" SUCH DAMAGE.
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.\"
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.\"
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.Dd June 5, 2025
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.Dd June 17, 2025
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.Dt CAPSICUM 4
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.Dt CAPSICUM 4
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.Os
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.Os
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.Sh NAME
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.Sh NAME
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@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@
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.Nm
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.Nm
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is a lightweight OS capability and sandbox framework implementing a hybrid
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is a lightweight OS capability and sandbox framework implementing a hybrid
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capability system model.
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capability system model.
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.Nm
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is designed to blend capabilities with UNIX.
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This approach achieves many of the benefits of least-privilege operation, while
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preserving existing UNIX APIs and performance, and presents application authors
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with an adoption path for capability-oriented design.
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.Pp
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Capabilities are unforgeable tokens of authority that can be delegated and must
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Capabilities are unforgeable tokens of authority that can be delegated and must
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be presented to perform an action.
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be presented to perform an action.
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.Nm
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.Nm
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@@ -59,6 +65,34 @@ namespaces) is restricted; only explicitly delegated rights, referenced by
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memory mappings or file descriptors, may be used.
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memory mappings or file descriptors, may be used.
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Once set, the flag is inherited by future children processes, and may not be
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Once set, the flag is inherited by future children processes, and may not be
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cleared.
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cleared.
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.Pp
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Access to system calls in capability mode is restricted: some system calls
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requiring global namespace access are unavailable, while others are
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constrained.
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For instance,
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.Xr sysctl 2
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can be used to query process-local information such as address space layout,
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but also to monitor a system’s network connections.
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.Xr sysctl 2
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is constrained by explicitly marking ≈60 of over 15000 parameters as permitted
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in capability mode; all others are denied.
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.Pp
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The system calls which require constraints are
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.Xr sysctl 2 ,
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.Xr shm_open 2
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.Pq which is permitted to create anonymous memory objects but not named ones
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and the
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.Xr openat 2
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family of system calls.
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The
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.Xr openat 2
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calls already accept a file descriptor argument as the directory to perform the
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.Xr open 2 ,
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.Xr rename 2 ,
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etc. relative to; in capability mode the
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.Xr openat 2
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family of system calls are constrained so that they can only operate on
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objects “under” the provided file descriptor.
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.It capabilities
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.It capabilities
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Limit operations that can be called on file descriptors.
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Limit operations that can be called on file descriptors.
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For example, a file descriptor returned by
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For example, a file descriptor returned by
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@@ -152,3 +186,14 @@ and
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.An Kris Kennaway Aq Mt kris@FreeBSD.org
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.An Kris Kennaway Aq Mt kris@FreeBSD.org
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at Google, Inc., and
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at Google, Inc., and
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.An Pawel Jakub Dawidek Aq Mt pawel@dawidek.net .
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.An Pawel Jakub Dawidek Aq Mt pawel@dawidek.net .
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Portions of this manual page are drawn from
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.Rs
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.%A Robert N. M. Watson
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.%A Jonathan Anderson
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.%A Ben Laurie
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.%A Kris Kennaway
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.%T Capsicum: practical capabilities for UNIX
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.%J USENIX Security Symposium
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.%D August 2010
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.%O DOI: 10.5555/1929820.1929824
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.Re
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