Since the case where secflavor < 0 indicates the security flavor is
to be negotiated, it could be a Kerberized mount. As such, filling in the "principal" argument using the canonized host name makes sense. If it is negotiated as AUTH_SYS, the "principal" argument is meaningless but harmless. Requested by: masato@itc.naist.jp Tested by: masato@itc.naist.jp PR: 201073 MFC after: 1 month
This commit is contained in:
@@ -591,8 +591,8 @@ getnfsargs(char *spec, struct iovec **iov, int *iovlen)
|
|||||||
* For a Kerberized nfs mount where the "principal"
|
* For a Kerberized nfs mount where the "principal"
|
||||||
* argument has not been set, add it here.
|
* argument has not been set, add it here.
|
||||||
*/
|
*/
|
||||||
if (got_principal == 0 && secflavor >= 0 &&
|
if (got_principal == 0 && secflavor != AUTH_SYS &&
|
||||||
secflavor != AUTH_SYS && ai_nfs->ai_canonname != NULL) {
|
ai_nfs->ai_canonname != NULL) {
|
||||||
snprintf(pname, sizeof (pname), "nfs@%s",
|
snprintf(pname, sizeof (pname), "nfs@%s",
|
||||||
ai_nfs->ai_canonname);
|
ai_nfs->ai_canonname);
|
||||||
build_iovec(iov, iovlen, "principal", pname,
|
build_iovec(iov, iovlen, "principal", pname,
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user