From 13fb6dbc738f4ba30e78a8fb21efa1382c520d33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Baptiste Daroussin Date: Tue, 9 Jun 2026 16:24:56 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] nuageinit: validate set-name to prevent shell injection in variable names MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Shell variable names cannot be safely quoted with shell_escape() — only alphanumeric characters are valid. Add validation that set-name only matches [a-zA-Z0-9]+; invalid values are rejected with a warning and the rename is skipped entirely. --- libexec/nuageinit/nuageinit | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/libexec/nuageinit/nuageinit b/libexec/nuageinit/nuageinit index 8ca1a2c558c..ba26f504eff 100755 --- a/libexec/nuageinit/nuageinit +++ b/libexec/nuageinit/nuageinit @@ -429,8 +429,12 @@ local function network_config(obj) local ifaces = get_ifaces_by_mac() local matched = ifaces[v.match.macaddress] if matched and matched == interface then - network:write("ifconfig_" .. interface .. "_name=" .. nuage.shell_escape(v["set-name"]) .. "\n") - interface = v["set-name"] + if not v["set-name"]:match("^[a-zA-Z0-9]+$") then + nuage.warn("set-name contains invalid characters, ignoring: " .. v["set-name"]) + else + network:write("ifconfig_" .. interface .. "_name=" .. nuage.shell_escape(v["set-name"]) .. "\n") + interface = v["set-name"] + end end end if v.dhcp4 then